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A new conceptual issue arises: a
tort problem.  Here, the class
recognizes immediately that our
house has no rules to govern the
situation, but I tell them that the
house across the street has had a
similar situation that has been
decided in a certain way.   We
think about whether we like that
rule and its reasoning.  We talk
about whether our house has to do
what the house across the street
does.  And we move into
variations on the idea of precedent
and its limits through differences
in our facts as well as in what we
wish to accomplish in creating our
own precedent.
Then we set the house into the
fictional “Hofstra” country with its
safeguards for individual rights.
When a dispute arises, ostensibly
resolved by the rules, the defense
argues that “it’s a free country, I
can do what I want.” We talk
about how the Constitution can
prevent legislatures from creating
unconstitutional rules and that
courts are called upon to interpret
and apply constitutional
principals.
We finish the exercise with a
burden of proof, fact/law
distinction situation. Here, the
person appears to be caught red-
handed possessing food in his
room and is accused of breaking a
rule that requires food to be eaten
only in the kitchen.  A court
makes a legal decision that the
rule does not apply to
“possessing” food, only eating it.
The “defendant” says that he
brought the food into his room, he
did not “eat” it there. But it is
half-eaten, and some people saw it
whole while it was in his room.
Who decides whether or not he
“ate” in his room?  How does a
fact finder make such a decision?
This exercise is fun.  It teaches the
students a lot about the broad
themes of law and starts to
introduce them to some of its
vocabulary, but it accomplishes
more than that.  They come to law
school expecting to be ignorant —
they read cases they do not
understand and get more confused
as they walk into many of their
classes.   This exercise reminds
them that their lives before here
and the knowledge they have
acquired in those lives are useful
tools for learning about law.   They
also learn that they can participate
without peril — there is no case
hanging over them that contains the
“right” answers.   All they are
being asked to do is think.  By
participating in the class
discussion, they learn also about
the interactive nature of law
learning.  Thus, the exercise
provides a valuable tool for a first
law school class.
Contact Donna Hill at
<lawdlh@hofstra.edu> 
if you would like a copy of the
exercise.
Using Fruit to Teach Analogy
Jane Kent Gionfriddo
Boston College Law School
One of my very creative
colleagues, Lis Keller, came up
with the following exercise to
introduce students to the correct
method of comparing precedent
cases with the client’s case in an
objective memorandum.  We had
been frustrated that students
seemed to think that comparing the
“facts” of a precedent case with the
“facts” of the client’s case, without
more, was sufficient.  Too often we
would get analysis like, “The court
would view doing laundry in our
case as similar to watching TV in
the case of ‘X.’” And as much as
we would tell students that
comparing “facts” with “facts” was
just the first step in predicting what
a future court would do, they didn’t
seem to understand what the
problem was.
Of course, we had already
discussed the analytical process
that students were doing in what
we call the “application-prediction”
section of an objective memo.  We
had worked through the process in
the abstract and even in the case
they were working on.  “You’re
tracking the reasoning of the future
court,” we had said, “and to do that
you must show WHY, using the
court’s reasoning in prior cases,
that the future court will view the
facts of precedent cases as similar
or dissimilar to the facts of your
client’s case.” But still students
didn’t seem to catch on.
So Lis decided to come up with an
exercise that would take this
complicated analytical concept and
simplify it.  She felt that a simple
exercise was a good first step
because it would help students
intuitively see why a “facts to facts
only” comparison was analytically
insufficient.  “What about fruit?”
she asked, and constructed the
following exercise.
We come into class with four
objects—a basket (my meager
contribution), and several real or
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“silk” pieces of fruit—a Granny
Smith apple (which, if you
remember, is green), a MacIntosh
apple (red), and a Bartlett pear
(green).
Holding up the MacIntosh apple,
we say, “The court finds that this
object belongs in the basket.”
Holding up the Bartlett pear, we
say, “The court finds that this
object does not belong in the
basket.” Then, holding up the
Granny Smith apple, we say, “this
object is now before the court.
Predict: Will the court find that it
‘belongs in the basket,’ or not?”
Of course, given the simple and
visual nature of this demonstration,
all students are immediately clear
that they can’t predict unless they
come up with the court’s reasoning
concerning why the MacIntosh
apple did belong in the basket and
the Bartlett pear did not.  Was it
concerned about the color of the
object?  Then the court would view
the Granny Smith apple as similar
to the Bartlett pear and find that it
doesn’t belong in the basket.  But if
the court’s reasoning was based on
kind of fruit or shape of object,
then it would view the Granny
Smith apple as belonging with the
MacIntosh apple in the basket.
We’ve found that this exercise so
clearly introduces this concept that
students are much better prepared
to handle the more complicated
process of comparing the facts of
legal precedent to their client’s
facts in figuring out what a future
court would conclude for their
client.  Moreover, the fruit exercise
becomes a wonderful vehicle as we
give written feedback to students
who continue to make inadequate
comparisons in their memos.
When the student writes, “doing
laundry in our case is similar to TV
watching in case ‘X,’” it becomes
so easy to write, “but WHY?
Remember the fruit.  You know you
can’t figure out whether the court
would view a Granny Smith apple
as like or unlike a Bartlett pear
until you figure out what the court
was concerned about—kind of
fruit, or color of object, or shape of
object, or something else.  The
same is true for ‘doing laundry’ and
‘watching TV.’ Only the courts’
reasoning in the precedent cases—
’activities that go on inside a
home’—shows WHY the future
court could see ‘doing laundry’ and
‘watching TV’ as similar activities.”
The “fruit exercise” then becomes a
short-hand way throughout the
year, both in class and in written
feedback, to get students to think
about the analytical process they
are “capturing” in spelling out a
comparison of precedent and
client’s facts in an objective memo.
Drawing Persuasive Comparisons 
Ben Brown
John Marshall Law School 
Drawing analogies is a very
commonsensical activity.  Since it
seems so natural, students often fail
to make their analogies persuasive
by systema-tically comparing facts
in their memorandums. They often
rely on mere assertions to prove
that their memo facts and the
precedent facts are comparable or
distinguishable. This exercise is
designed to encourage a discussion
about what makes a factual
comparison persuasive.  This
exercise is often most effective
after the students have attempted at
least one memorandum project.
The ultimate lesson here is that
factual comparisons, to be
persuasive, must be specific, direct
and comprehensive.  After each
example in the exercise, I
encourage students to discuss the
strengths and weaknesses of the
attempt to make a persuasive
comparison.
Reasoning by Analogy: Since
reasoning by analogy is a unique
way of deciding crucial issues, it is
not often taught.  As a legal writer,
you need to give some thought to
how best convince a sophisticated
reader that your analogy is, indeed,
sound.
The basic rule is: The more direct,
specific and comprehensive you
can make the comparison, then the
more persuasive it will be.
Example:
I am trying to convince you that a
professor’s commute to school is
longer than a student’s commute to
school.
First — I could just assert it.
The professor has a longer
commute then his student. 
Does this convince you?
If I am in a position of power, you
might accept this statement as true;
thus courts can get away with this
type of sloppy analogizing.  But if
you have no compelling reason to
trust me — that is, if you are a
skeptical reader as you must
assume all legal readers are — then
the mere assertion will not suffice
to convince you of this proposition.
Second — I could add some
general facts that support my
claim.
Since professors make more money
then most students, they can afford
to live in the suburbs and thus take
longer to get to school.
Generalities might add some
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